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AN EASTERN ORTHODOX CONCEPTION  
OF THEOSIS AND HUMAN NATURE
Jonathan D. Jacobs
Although foreign—and perhaps shocking—to many in the west, the doctrine 
of theosis is central to the theology and practice of Eastern Orthodoxy. On 
the Orthodox view, the goal of human existence and the purpose of creation 
is that God unite himself to creation with humanity at the focal point. In this 
paper, I explore an account of human nature inspired by a robustly meta-
physical reading of the Orthodox conception of theosis. 
Although foreign—and perhaps shocking—to many in the west, the doc-
trine of theosis is central in the theology and practice of Eastern Ortho-
doxy. Theosis is “the ultimate goal of human existence”1 and indeed is “a 
way of summing up the purpose of creation”:2 that God will unite himself 
to all of creation with humanity at the focal point. 
What are human persons, that they might be united to God? That is 
the question I explore in this paper. In particular, I explore an account of 
human nature inspired by an Eastern Orthodox conception of theosis. In 
section 1, I present a theological vision of theosis in the Eastern church. 
In section 2, I offer an interpretation of what it might mean for human 
nature to become deformed by the Fall and transformed by the Incarna-
tion. Then, in section 3, I present an (admittedly speculative) account of 
human nature, based on a robustly metaphysical reading of an Orthodox 
conception of theosis. On that account—to overly simplify things, and 
postponing important qualiﬁcations—we might say that a human being 
is the union of soul and body with God. Finally, given that account of hu-
man nature, I offer in section 3 some brief reflections on the prospects of a 
scientiﬁc anthropology. 
1. Theosis
The concept of theosis (or deiﬁcation or divinization) is not explicitly used 
in Scripture, but it is rooted therein.3 “I said you are gods,” the Psalmist 
1G. I. Mantzaridis, The Deiﬁcation of Man (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
1984), p. 12.
2A. Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature, ed. 
M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Press, 2007), p. 36.
3In this section, I draw heavily from J. Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas (London: 
The Faith Press, 1964); J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal 
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has God say when addressing humans, “sons of the most high—all of 
you” (Psalm 82:6). And Peter tells us of the “exceedingly great and pre-
cious” promise that we will become “partakers of the divine nature” (1 
Peter 1:4). 
What was hinted at in Scripture became explicit in the early church. Ire-
naeus of Lyons claimed that God “became what we are in order to make 
us what he is himself.”4 Clement of Alexandria says that “he who obeys 
the Lord and follows the prophecy given through him . . . becomes a god 
while still moving about in the flesh.”5 “God became man,” Athanasius 
famously tells us, “so that men might become gods.”6 Cyril of Alexandria 
says that we “are called ‘temples of God’ and indeed ‘gods,’ and so we 
are.”7 Basil claims that “becoming a god” is the highest goal of all.8 Grego-
ry of Nazianzus implores us to “become gods for his sake, since he became 
man for our sake.”9 Such quotations are a small selection of the many and 
varied appeals to theosis in the early church. 
Theosis is not merely an Eastern teaching; it is catholic. The Catechism of 
the Roman Catholic church, for example, quotes Ireneaus and Athanasius, 
as above, but also Aquinas when he says that “[t]he only-begotten Son of 
God, wanting to make us sharers in his divinity, assumed our nature, so 
that he, made man, might make men gods.”10
But while talk of becoming gods is widespread in the early church, it’s 
not clear there was widespread agreement about the nature of theosis. 
Norman Russell speaks broadly of four uses of the language of theosis in 
the early church.11 The “nominal” use applies “god” to humans merely as 
a title of honor. The “analogical” use applies the term to humans by analo-
gy, as, for example, the wise man is a god to the fool. On the “ethical” use, 
the term is applied to humans who become like Christ through reﬁnement 
of their character, when they have become similar in certain respects to 
Christ. Finally, on the “realistic” use, the term applies to humans whose 
nature has been, in some sense, transformed in virtue of participation in 
or union with God. 
Themes (New York: Fordham University Press, 1974); V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the 
Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976); P. Nellas, Deiﬁcation in 
Christ: The Nature of the Human Person (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997); 
J. Gross, The Divinization of the Christian According to the Greek Fathers (Anaheim, CA: A & 
C Press, 2002); K. Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
2002); N. Russell, The Doctrine of Deiﬁcation in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); and Christensen and Wittung, Partakers of the Divine Nature.
4Against Heresies 5, Preface. 
5Stromateis 7. 
6De Incarnatione 54. 
7Dialogues on the Trinity 7. 
8De Spiritu Sancto 9. 
9First Oration. 
10From the Cathechism, Section 2, Article 3, Paragraph 1, 460. The Aquinas quotation 
comes from Opusculum 57. 
11Russell, The Doctrine of Deiﬁcation in the Greek Patristic Tradition.
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It is this later, metaphysical, understanding of theosis that came to 
dominate in the east. On this view, to become a god is to become trans-
formed by uniting ourselves to God. As Louth puts it, 
What is envisaged is a transformation, a transﬁguration, of human beings. 
Those are big words, but what is certainly meant is a real change: a change 
that is the result of coming to share in the life of God.12
Orthodox theology wants to speak of this change in terms of ontology, not 
because this change involves a conversion into something other than hu-
man, but rather because the change involved is fundamental, radical, a re-
building of what it is to be human from the roots up.13
This last, realistic sense of theosis is the sense I am interested in. It is cer-
tainly not the only legitimate understanding of theosis, not even in East-
ern Orthodoxy itself. It is, nevertheless, the dominant view in the east. 
Because of this, and because I think it has interesting implications for an 
understanding of human nature, I shall hereafter speak only of the re-
alistic sense of theosis. In particular, I shall understand theosis as, ﬁrst, 
the transformation of the human person and, second, participation in or 
union with God. 
1.1 The Image 
To better understand this conception of theosis, let us begin by consider-
ing the Eastern doctrine of the image of God. Genesis tells us that man 
was created in the image of God. In the early church, the image in man 
is identiﬁed in a variety of ways: our moral virtues, our rationality, our 
free will, for example, or the immortality of the soul. Later, in the Eastern 
church, the image of God in man came to be understood, not as any one 
part of a human person, but the whole of the person. 
This static description of the image of God in man is coupled with a dy-
namic description of the likeness of God in man. Man was created perfect, 
not in ﬁnality, but in the sense of perfect potentiality. He did not possess 
his end, union with God, but was rather called to it. Thus “[t]he perfection 
of our ﬁrst nature lay above all in this capacity to . . . be united more and 
more with the fullness of the Godhead.”14 As a result of this unrealized 
capacity, we can say that “man at his ﬁrst creation was innocent and ca-
pable of spiritual development.”15 Hence, according to the Eastern church, 
humanity’s perfection was something it was called to realize fully. The 
image is “a gift within man but at the same time a goal set before him, a 
possession but also a destiny.”16 
12Louth, “The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology,” p. 37. 
13Ibid., pp. 39–40. 
14Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 126. 
15Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 52. 
16Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 37. 
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One way to interpret the claim that our destiny is union with God is to 
suppose that, as Ware puts it, “man has God as the innermost center of his 
being.”17 Human persons have what Nellas calls a “theological structure.”18 
According to this conception, a human person is not fully his or herself 
apart from God. According to Meyendorff, “[m]an has been created not as 
an autonomous, or self-sufficient, being; his very nature is truly itself only 
inasmuch as it exists ‘in God’ or ‘in grace.’”19 Meyendorff calls this essen-
tial feature, which I’ll return to below, humanity’s openness to God. 
1.2 Union Without Confusion: Essence, Energy and Hypostasis
Humanity’s openness to God is an openness to participation in or union 
with God. Following Gregory Palamas,20 we may distinguish three types 
of union (without confusion) with God. Union in essence holds only 
amongst the three hypostases of the Trinity, who are united (one essence) 
without confusion (three hypostases).21 Hypostatic union holds between 
the divine and human natures of Christ. Here, again, there is union (one 
hypostasis) without confusion (two natures). Finally, there is union in en-
ergy between the deiﬁed person and the divine energies. 
To understand this later form of union without confusion, unique in 
Eastern thought, we must ﬁrst understand the distinction between essence 
and energy.22 In his essence, God is transcendent, unknowable, incommu-
nicable. But the divine energies are immanent, knowable, communicable. 
The divine energies are the activities of God, divine operations or mani-
festations. They are not the effects of God; nor are they emanations from 
God. They are “God Himself in His activities”23 and “natural processions 
of God Himself.”24 These uncreated energies are not personal beings, but 
are rather manifestations or modes of existence of a personal being.25 As 
Ware puts it, “essence signiﬁes the whole God as he is in himself; the ener-
gies signify the whole God as he is in action.”26
17Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 52. 
18Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 42. 
19Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, p. 138. 
20See, especially, Capita 75, where he distinguishes three “realities” in God: essence, en-
ergy and the three divine hypostases. 
21Some in Eastern Orthodoxy think that this very same type of union, union in essence, 
was intended to hold among human persons. See, for example, Lossky, The Mystical Theology 
of the Eastern Church; and J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1985).
22See K. Ware, “God Hidden and Revealed: The Apophatic Way and the Essence-Energies 
Distinction,” Eastern Churches Review 7 (1975), pp. 125–136; and D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East 
and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) for further discussion. 
23Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 22.
24Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 54.
25Ibid., pp. 56–57.
26Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 22.
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Though human persons by their very nature are open to union with 
God, they are not capable of union with God in his essence. If human per-
sons were united to the essence of God, they would be God by nature, 
and hence God would not be triune but a multitude. Neither are human 
persons capable of being united hypostatically to one of the persons of the 
Trinity, for that sort of union is unique to the Son.27 Theosis is, therefore, 
union with God in his energies according to the Eastern church. This en-
ergetic union is not a “fusion or confusion”;28 neither is it an “ontological 
commingling of the divine with the human nature.”29 It is, rather, a genu-
ine union of God, in his energies, with human persons. 
1.3 The Fall 
God placed Adam on the path to such a union, but unfortunately Adam 
chose a different path. What God offered Adam through grace—union 
with himself—Adam pursued on his own accord. In doing so, he re-ori-
ented himself away from union with God; he turned from “God-centered-
ness to self-centeredness.”30
While Adam’s sin did not destroy the image of God in man—it was “ob-
scured but not obliterated”31—his sin did, according to the Eastern church, 
effect a change in human nature.32 It is this distorted nature, not original 
guilt, that Adam passed on to future generations.33 In this sense, sin intro-
duced a kind of sickness needing healing, not merely a legal debt needing 
payment. Because of this sick or “mutilated”34 nature, man was no longer 
capable of union with God. “The original natural chasm between God and 
man”—which man was called to bridge through grace—was “insuper-
ably widened” after the Fall.35 The Fall had thus “rendered man inferior to 
his vocation.”36 
In short, the Fall caused human nature itself to become deformed. The 
descendants of Adam were thus incapable of being deiﬁed without some 
dramatic change—a restoration or recreation of human nature. 
27See, among many others, Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 70, for 
this sort of argument.
28Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 22.
29 R. G. Stephanopoulos, “The Orthodox Doctrine of Theosis,” in The New Man: An Or-
thodox and Reformed Dialogue, ed. J. Meyendorff and J. McLelland (New Brunswick: Agora 
Books, 1973), p. 150.
30Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 59.
31Ibid., p. 61.
32See below for a discussion of what it might mean for a nature to be changed.
33See J. Romanides, The Ancestral Sin (Ridgewood, NJ: Zephyr Publishing, 1998) for fur-
ther discussion.
34Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 125.
35Stephanopoulos, “The Orthodox Doctrine of Theosis,” p. 155.
36V. Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1978), p. 74.
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1.4 The Incarnation 
That is what, according to the Eastern church, Christ accomplished in the 
Incarnation. Christ took upon himself human nature and united it to the 
divine nature, thereby transforming it. “Recasting human nature as if it 
were a shattered and ruined statue, He raised it up new, spiritual, and 
imperishable.”37 It is for this reason that it would be appropriate to refer 
to the birth of Christ as the birthday of the human race,38 for it was at the 
moment of the union of the divine and human natures in the person of 
Christ that human nature was remade.39
God’s ultimate goal of union with humanity was never destroyed, but 
the means of achieving the goal were changed on account of the Fall. 
“What man ought to have attained by raising himself up to God, God 
achieved by descending to man.”40 This achievement, the change in hu-
man nature accomplished by Christ, is not human nature’s destruction, 
but its transformation. Were Christ to have destroyed human nature and 
created a new nature, akin to but numerically distinct from human nature, 
then Christ would not have saved humanity, but destroyed it. It was the 
purpose of humanity, itself—not some other, similar nature—that Christ 
fulﬁlled. “[T]he vocation of the ﬁrst Adam was fulﬁlled by Christ, the sec-
ond Adam.”41
Of course Christ did not achieve the deiﬁcation of each individual hu-
man person. Rather, he accomplished the transformation of human nature, 
so that those who acquire this new nature are once again capable of theosis. 
The deiﬁcation of particular human persons still requires the grace of God 
and their cooperation (in the sacramental life, ascetic discipline, and so 
on). But the Incarnation set back on the path to theosis those who acquire 
this transformed human nature. 
1.5 Baptism 
How, then, are we to acquire this transformed human nature? According 
to the Eastern church, it is though the sacrament of baptism. “Through 
baptism man’s biological being actually participates in the death and res-
urrection of Christ. Baptism is literally a new birth in Christ and in this 
sense a new creation of man.”42
For this reason Gregory Palamas speaks of baptism as the resurrection 
of the soul that had died as a result of the Fall. It is the ﬁrst resurrection, 
37Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 113.
38See On the Nativity of Christ, attributed to Basil.
39Of course this does not entail that Christ’s human nature was, at the moment of his birth, 
both transformed and deiﬁed. 
40V. Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
2001), p. 136.
41Ibid., pp. 133–134.
42Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 121.
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followed by the second resurrection of the body.43 Baptism, then, is not 
merely for the forgiveness of sins, though it is that. It is also “an onto-
logical event; it refashions and completes [man’s] created being.”44 It is 
therefore quite appropriate to speak, as Maximos the Confessor does,45 of 
baptism as a second form of generation. Our ﬁrst birth makes us sons of 
Adam; our second, sons of God. 
Baptism, of course, is not sufficient for theosis. Rather, baptism, the put-
ting on of a new nature, makes theosis once again possible. It re-orients us 
toward God. The journey to union further requires the grace of God and 
a person’s cooperation (the sacramental life, ascetic discipline, and so on). 
1.6 Summary 
Theosis is the union of a human person with God in his energies. Theosis 
was our original purpose and was written into our nature, but the Fall 
deformed our nature and made theosis impossible. God therefore united 
himself to human nature, in the person of the Son, and transformed it so 
that we are once again capable of union with him. The transformation of 
each of our own natures is accomplished in the sacrament of baptism, but 
theosis itself requires the grace of God and each person’s cooperation. 
2. The Transformation of Nature
What might it mean for human nature to be changed or transformed by the 
Fall and again by the Incarnation? If human nature were literally changed, 
it would no longer be human nature.46
Maximus the Confessor, in speaking of this nature “instituted afresh,” 
speaks of it as a new mode of existence.47 It is, in that sense, not a different 
nature, but a different way of having the nature, a different way of being 
human. There are, on this way of understanding the talk of changes in 
human nature, at least two ways of being human: the before-the-Fall way 
and the after-the-Incarnation-and-baptism way. 
One possible way to better understand these different ways of being 
human is to consider the concept of a normative kind introduced by Nich-
olas Wolterstorff.48 A norm-kind, for Wolterstorff, is a kind that can have 
properly and improperly formed instances. He is primarily concerned 
with the thesis that art works are norm-kinds—so that, say, a poorly per-
formed instance of a symphony is still an instance of that symphony—but 
43Triads, 1.
44Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 124.
45To Thalassios: On Various Questions, 61.
46I’m thankful to Terence Cuneo and David Bradshaw for helping me see the importance 
of this point. 
47David Bradshaw pointed this out to me. See On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Se-
lected Writings from St. Maximus the Confessor, ed. P. M. Blowers and R. L. Wilken (Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003).
48See N. Wolterstorff, “Towards an Ontology of Art Works,” Nous 9 (1975), pp. 115– 142. 
My thanks to Terence Cuneo for this suggestion.
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we can abstract away from his speciﬁc considerations and apply the con-
cept to human nature. Improperly formed instances of a kind are incorrect, 
damaged, malfunctioning. This captures nicely the view of fallen human 
nature under consideration; it is deformed, mutilated. After the Fall and 
before the Incarnation and baptism, instances of the kind human, human 
persons, are no longer capable of union with God. They are malfunction-
ing. So the relation between pre- and post-Fall human nature seems to 
mirror the relation between properly and improperly formed instances of 
a norm-kind.49 
3. Human Nature
What should one who accepts this view of theosis say about human na-
ture? The central question, it seems to me, is how we should understand 
what Meyendorff calls the openness of human nature to God. I suggest we 
understand it in this way: God is—or, properly speaking, the divine ener-
gies are—metaphysically built into the structure of true human nature. 
Recall how humanity’s openness to God is characterized. Human per-
sons are said to have a theological structure, with God at the center of their 
being. It is tempting to interpret this idea in a metaphysically innocent 
way. Perhaps all that it means to be open to God in this way is that human 
persons have a natural disposition to desire to be close to God, and feel 
empty when they are far from him. Or perhaps all that it means is that we 
are incapable of fulﬁlling our vocation without God’s help. 
But it is difficult to square these deflationary conceptions of the open-
ness of humanity to God with the idea that the openness thesis, as we 
might call it, is a metaphysical or ontological claim. It is not merely a claim 
about our psychology; it is a metaphysical claim about our very being. 
It is a claim about what it is to be a human being, just as we might claim 
that what it is to be an atom is to be composed of protons, neutrons and 
electrons related in a certain way. 
Furthermore, when we are distant from God, the result is not merely 
psychological. It is ontological. Absent from God, the claim is, we are not 
fully human. As Ware puts it, “[t]o believe that man is made in God’s im-
age is to believe that man is created for communion and union with God, 
and that if he rejects this communion he ceases to be properly man.”50 
49A full articulation of the transformation of human nature, however, requires discussion 
of the relation between pre-Fall and post-Incarnation human nature. If the Incarnation sim-
ply restored it to its original state, then the distinction between properly and improperly 
formed instances of a norm-kind would sufficiently capture the distinction between pre-
Fall and post-Incarnation human natures, since they would be identical. But there is some 
sense in which the post-Incarnation human nature is better than pre-Fall human nature. 
As Ware puts it, the Incarnation “effects more than a reversal of the Fall. . . . When God 
becomes man, this marks the beginnings of an essentially new stage in the history of man, 
and not just a return to the past. The Incarnation raised man to a new level; the last state is 
higher than the ﬁrst” (Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 70). I leave a full discussion of this issue 
for another time. 
50Ware, The Orthodox Way, p. 52.
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Similarly, Nellas claims that when a human person “denies God he denies 
himself and destroys himself.”51
So it is difficult to square any deflationary interpretation of the open-
ness of humanity with the metaphysical nature of the claim—difficult, but 
not impossible. No doubt one could interpret the openness thesis in a non-
metaphysical or non-ontological way, and in a manner consistent with or-
thodoxy and the spirit of Eastern Orthodoxy. But I would like to consider 
what it might be like to interpret the openness thesis in a metaphysically 
robust way. It seems to me that one can undergo a sort of gestalt shift 
once one attempts this. All manner of phrases or sayings that we normally 
interpret as mere analogies can suddenly jump out as surprisingly onto-
logical claims about God’s literal presence in each human person. East-
ern Orthodox Christians are accustomed to praying, “O heavenly King, 
Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, Who art everywhere present and ﬁllest all 
things. . . .” We are told, in Acts 7:28, that it is in God that “we live and 
move and have our being,” and, in 1 Corinthians 6:19, that “your body is 
a temple of the Holy Spirit.” In 1 John 4:15, we are promised that “he who 
abides in love abides in God, and God in him.” 
How might we take seriously—literally!—this presence of God in the 
believer? One way, I suggest, is to interpret the openness thesis in a ro-
bustly metaphysical way. What, then, might that look like? Consider, for 
the sake of comparison, a fairly traditional account of human nature in the 
west, hylomorphism, according to which the human person is the union 
of soul and body. The soul is the form of the body. While most forms can-
not exist independently of that of which they are the form, because the 
intellectual soul has capacities that are not dependent upon the body, it 
can exist separately. Nevertheless, the human person is not the soul; nor 
is she the body. The human person is the union of the soul and body. At 
death, when the soul and body separate, the body ceases to exist (as a hu-
man body), but the soul continues on. 
Compare this, briefly, to substance dualism, according to which the hu-
man person is identical with the soul. The person has a body, but is not 
identical with it. The soul, on this view, is an independent substance ca-
pable of existing without the body. Hence, the human person is capable of 
existing without the body. 
The debate between dualism and hylomorphism—whether the soul 
is the form of the body or an independent substance—is orthogonal to 
the issue at hand concerning the openness thesis. Either view, it seems to 
me, can accept the understanding of the openness thesis that I propose. 
Nevertheless, it’s helpful to consider the relationship between the human 
person and her body that is proposed by the hylomorphist. What should 
the hylomorphist say about the human person after death but before the 
resurrection of the body? The person, if she continues to exist after death 
at all, exists in an incomplete way. For if she were supposed to exist in 
51Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 42.
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a complete manner, then the distinction between dualism and hylomor-
phism becomes blurred. The human person just is the soul, if the soul is 
all that exists with which to be identical. (Note here that I am not at pres-
ent objecting to either dualism or hylomorphism. I am rather trying to 
clarify the nature of the relationship between the human person and her 
body, were hylomorphism correct. Whether dualism or hylomorphism is 
consistent with other Eastern Orthodox teaching I will leave for another 
discussion.) 
The hylomorphist, it seems, should say that either the human person 
ceases to exist after death—an option difficult to square with, say, the doc-
trine of the communion of saints—or that the human person continues 
to exist but in an incomplete or unnatural way. As Aquinas says, the dis-
embodied soul has an “aptitude and a natural inclination” to be reunited 
with the body.52 Only after the resurrection of the body does the human 
person exist fully, as it is her nature to be. 
I propose that we think of the relationship between the human person 
and divine energies similar to the way that the hylomorphist thinks of the 
relationship between the human person and her body. Just as the body is 
literally a metaphysical component of a fully human person, so too those 
who accept the Eastern conception of theosis outlined above should think 
that the divine energies are literally a metaphysical component of a fully 
human person. But just as the human person can perhaps exist in an in-
complete manner apart from her body on the hylomorphist conception, so 
too a human person can exist in an incomplete manner apart from union 
with God. 
For ease of presentation, let’s adopt the hylomorphic account of the 
human person. (What I say can, I think, be accepted mutatis mutandis by 
dualists.) Taking into account the openness thesis, we should say that a 
human person is the union of soul and body53 with the divine energies. 
Human nature had, prior to the Fall, and has through baptism, a natu-
ral inclination to such union with God. To the extent that a person is not 
united with God—the divine energies do not penetrate a person’s very 
being—the person is not fully human. 
Indeed, Maximus the Confessor explicitly adopts a similar proposal in 
his discussion of what it might mean to be, in Gregory of Nazianzus’s 
phrase, a “part of God.”54 Whereas I have suggested that God is united 
to the full human person, body and soul, Maximus suggests that God 
is united to the soul: “He becomes to their souls like a soul related to a 
body.” This difference, I think, is not relevant for present purposes. What 
is important is that, according to Maximus, the whole of God is present in, 
united to, the whole of the deiﬁed human person. 
52Summa Theologica, I, 76, 1, ad 6.
53Again, it does not matter for present purposes whether one thinks of the human person 
as a union of soul and body or as just the soul or even as just the body. Whatever one says 
there, one can then say that that thing is united to the divine energies.
54Ambigua 7. The phrase comes from Gregory’s Oration 14.
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Union seems to be the sort of thing that can come in degrees. One can, it 
seems, be more or less uniﬁed with God. Hence there is a clear conception 
of how a human person can be more or less human—she can be more or 
less united to God. The result seems to be that being a human person, on 
this view, is gradable. On the one extreme stands fallen human nature, not 
only not united with God but incapable of union with him. On the other 
stands transformed and deiﬁed human nature, fully united with God—
the exemplar of which is Jesus Christ. 
This view of human nature, I think, ﬁts well with an Eastern Ortho-
dox conception of theosis. Human nature, as Meyendorff puts it, “does 
not possess an autonomous existence, but supposes grace and communion 
with God, in order to fulﬁll its own true destiny . . . ,”55 Man’s “true hu-
manity is realized only when he lives ‘in God.’”56 Human nature was cre-
ated incomplete, with an openness to God, and each human person was 
called to ﬁll that open place in their being with God—to become deiﬁed 
and thereby to realize fully her own human nature. 
3.1 Objections and Replies 
It might be objected that union between God and man would blur the 
distinction between creator and creature, a distinction that must be main-
tained if we are to remain orthodox. But it should be clear that the type of 
union proposed here does no such thing. It is a union between humanity 
and the divine energies, not God in his essence. Such an energetic union is 
a species of a type of union, the other species of which are union in essence 
and hypostatic union. In each case, there is union without confusion. If 
the other sorts of genuine union can be accomplished without confusion, 
it’s not clear why the union proposed here can’t be accomplished without 
confusion as well. 
A second possible objection is that this view of human nature, claiming 
as it does that those who are not baptized are not fully human, is demean-
ing to non-Christians. In response, it should be noted that the proposal is 
that human nature is a spectrum, and each of us falls short on that spec-
trum. Each of us, that is, not merely those who are not baptized, is less 
than fully human. 
A third objection, I think, is more serious. Full union with God, it is 
often claimed, is impossible since God is inﬁnite. If that were true and full 
human nature requires complete union with God, then it looks as though 
it would be impossible to be fully human. But, ﬁrst, it’s not clear to me that 
full union with God is impossible, since the union proposed here is union 
with the divine energies not union with God in essence. In fact, Nellas 
speaks of our call to “transcend the limited boundaries of creation and 
become inﬁnite.”57 Second, even if full union were impossible, I’m not sure 
55Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, p. 121.
56Ibid., p. 139.
57Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 28, emphasis added.
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that the result is too problematic. For even if full human nature were im-
possible, it would still be possible to become ever more human, as union 
with God becomes a fuller and fuller reality. 
If we combine this third objection, though, with the claim that union 
with God does not come in degrees—it’s all or nothing—the problem be-
comes more serious. For then it looks as though none of us are or ever 
will be—or even ever can be—human at all. And that, surely, is a result 
we should reject. What we should not say, then, is both that full union 
with God is impossible and that full union with God is necessary to be a 
human person. 
This seems to force a choice. We can either say that union with God 
comes in degrees, and hence perhaps being a human is a matter of de-
grees, or we can say that union with God is all or nothing, and it is the ca-
pacity for union with God that is essential to human nature. It seems to me 
that the former option is preferable. The later option, for example, entails 
that fallen human nature, since it is incapable of union with God, is after 
all not genuinely human nature. 
4. Scientiﬁc Anthropology?
I turn now to some brief reflections on the role of science in anthropology. 
What role does science play in our efforts to learn about human nature? 
There is a clear sense that, if humanity truly has a theological structure as 
we have been claiming, science has a limited role in our understanding of 
human nature. 
First, as Lossky puts it, in our world “the decrepitude of the old Adam 
too often hides from our eyes the incorruptibility of the new Adam.”58 If 
we are seeking to understand human nature by observation of this fallen 
world, we are, according to Nellas, “searching for something which is nat-
ural in the midst of what is unnatural.”59 True human nature, transformed 
and deiﬁed, is rarely witnessed in this world. “That which empirical ob-
servation calls ‘human nature’ is in biblical and patristic teaching”60 not 
true human nature. 
It is only when our nature is transformed and deiﬁed, says Ware, that 
“we see revealed the full possibilities of our human nature.” Before then, 
“the true implications of our personhood are still hidden from us.”61 The 
full reality of human nature, therefore, is not revealed by scientiﬁc obser-
vation, but is rather “illuminated inwardly.”62 For it is there that we will 
ﬁnd God himself. “[F]or man God is not an external ‘principle’ (archē) on 
which man depends, but truly and in reality his ontological origin (archē) 
58Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, p. 184.
59Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 43.
60Ibid., p. 45.
61Ware, The Orthodox Way, pp. 70–71.
62Nellas, Deiﬁcation in Christ, p. 41.
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and consumation.”63 Hence it is by becoming what we truly are that we 
most fully learn about true human nature. 
This is consistent with a scientiﬁc understanding of fallen human na-
ture, of course. But, second, according to the Eastern church theosis trans-
forms the entire human person, including her sense perceptual capacities. 
Hence the deiﬁed are those who see things as they truly are. (This is why, 
for example, icon writers copy the icons of those iconographers who are 
truly holy, since it is theirs whose sight has been transformed.) Clearly, 
then, our fallen faculties do not fully reveal to us things as they truly are, 
even the nature of fallen human nature. 
Does this entail a general skepticism about our epistemic situation prior 
to theosis? I think not. Our current epistemic situation is not unlike that of 
an autistic person. Autistic persons can perceive much in the world, and 
indeed often have a more ﬁnely tuned ability to perceive some things. But 
autistic persons do not have the sort of abilities others have when it comes 
to perceiving persons. They may be able to see facial expressions, for ex-
ample, and describe them accurately in detail, but they cannot see them 
for what they truly are, expressions of emotion, say. Similarly, our fallen 
sense capacities need not be unreliable in general in what they deliver for 
them to be defective. It may be that we can see things in the world accu-
rately, we just cannot see them for what they truly are. 
Science, then, is limited in what it can deliver regarding knowledge of 
human nature. It can be, and indeed is, vital regarding our knowledge of 
fallen human nature. And it can help us understand part of true human 
nature. But because true human nature is not merely biological but theo-
logical, knowledge of true human nature requires theology. And since the-
ology cannot be divorced from experience, in the Eastern church, knowl-
edge of true human nature requires mystical union with God. 
5. Conclusion
The doctrine of theosis is central to the Eastern church. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that it should have implications for an Eastern understanding 
of various other topics, including our understanding of human nature. 
According to the doctrine of theosis, human persons are created for the 
purpose of union with God. One way to interpret this is to say that God is, 
quite literally, a component of true human nature. A true human person, 
on such an understanding, is the union of soul and body with God.64
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